Copyright The
International Herald Tribune
November 12, 2007
By Eric Dash
When the
country's three largest banks reached agreement on how to
structure a $75 billion fund to prop up distressed securities,
an exhausted group of top planners gathered in a Bank of America
conference room to toast their success with 12-packs of beer.
But the
celebration Friday might have come too soon.
Having settled on
the fund's composition, officials from Bank of America,
Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase will now have to raise more than
$60 billion of the fund from dozens of financial institutions
around the globe in the next few weeks. The goal is to have the
fund operating by the end of the year. But the big question is:
Will it actually help?
The answer, some
analysts and big investors say, is probably not much. The backup
fund will not save troubled structured-investment vehicles, or
SIVs, that hold billions of dollars in packaged loans, though it
could delay their demise.
It may help calm
the turbulent credit markets by preventing a sharp sell-off of
securities, though analysts say the fund will probably not be
able to offset the deteriorating prices of the securities.
Banks, meanwhile,
may benefit if the backup fund can reignite trading in the
packaged loan market and keep SIV assets from bogging down their
own balance sheets.
"It is quickly
being realized that it doesn't really solve the problems," said
Joshua Rosner, a managing director at the research firm Graham
Fisher who had been skeptical of the proposal. "The path they
have taken of skimming off the cream from the top doesn't
resolve the fact there is poison at the bottom."
The backup fund
will not help troubled structured-investment vehicles survive.
Nor is it intended to do so. Rather, it is meant to help set a
market price for the securities they hold.
Structured
investment vehicles are entities created by banks and hedge
funds that own pools of home, auto and credit card loans.
They became a
booming business, dependent on easy credit from investors as
well as confidence in the packaged loans they bought.
Now this business
model is ailing, because both credit and confidence are in short
supply. And the backup fund may not cushion the blows as much as
originally thought.
For one, the
credit markets have worsened since the proposal was set in
motion with the assistance of the Treasury Department in
September. And some of the technical details of the way the
backup fund is to be structured could limit its impact.
First, the three
banks have committed to put up only about $5 billion to $10
billion each, leaving the remaining portion of the $75 billion
to be funded by other financial institutions, according to a
person involved with the plan.
The 30 or so
remaining SIVs have about $250 billion in assets they need to
unload in the coming months. That suggests the backup fund will
not serve as a meaningful purchaser of last resort, even if it
wanted to.
Where the backup
fund may have an impact is in stabilizing the financial markets,
though only to a point.
The backup fund
will not purchase the most distressed assets in the SIVs. Bank
organizers agreed that it would not accept any subprime-mortgage-related
assets or many types of risky, complex instruments like
collateralized debt obligations.
But the criteria
mean that SIVs, or the banks that sponsor them, will be left
holding their most battered securities or worse - they may be
forced to sell them at fire-sale prices.
Meanwhile, the
backup fund is expected to charge SIVs a fee of up to 1 percent
for participation, making it prohibitively expensive for them.