Super SIV -- The M-LEC
CreditClutch

 

Creatively Working Spreads Using Sometimes Off-balance Sheet Speculation At Increased Risk & Higher Yields

 

Using a very visible veneer of respectability, Citigroup may have staved off huge write offs & write downs.

The CDO is one element in the process of gathering & spreading credit while shifting risk & gaining yield using primary and secondary markets to absorb synthetics using tranche mechanisms.
Structured investment vehicles, SIVs, are off-balance sheet funds created by banks. These issue short-term debt (commercial paper, etc.) to acquire & finance specific longer-term assets --recently subprime mortgage-backed securities and similar assets.
Citigroup, JPMorgan, & BankAmerica have created a SuperSIV conduit backed by other major banks to serve as a buyer of last resort.
Possibly some day the next sources needed to fund the next new fund may not have the funds to fund that new fund.
October 15, 2007 -- Three US banks, Citigroup, JPMorgan, & BankAmerica announced a new mechanism & fund of approximately $80 to $100 billion. The new Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, or M-LEC, will be in operation within 90 days. It is expected hold the assets until maturity to prevent an overhang on markets. The M-LEC, will be used to bail out risk-takers who get caught taking excessive risk, including Citigroup and other SIV investors. This super conduit will be empowered to purchase assets from any bank or fund around the world.
According to a Moody's report in July, 2007, in total worldwide, banks manage 36 SIVs.
SIVs are typically purchased by institutional investors seeking to increase returns without significantly raising credit risk, thereby lowering ratings and increasing borrowing costs.
According to data from the Federal Reserve, the amount of commercial paper backed by mortgages and other assets fell to less than $900 billion as of October 10, from $1.18 trillion on August 8. According to data from Bloomberg, the yield on 3-month commercial paper rose to 6.20% in early September from about 5.30% in the preceding month. In the last three weeks, it has declined to around 5.36%.
In September, the US Treasury's Robert Steel, deputy under secretary for domestic finance, and Anthony Ryan, assistant secretary for financial markets, gathered top executives from around 30 banks into a Washington meeting. Reportedly Treasury realized that the banks involved were not talking to one another about the crisis. The US Treasury, established the fund to be used to prevent a broader security sell-off that would force additional write offs & write downs.
Citigroup reportedly has approximately $80 billion worth of SIVs. Neither JPMorgan nor BankAmerica own SIVs. JPMorgan and BankAmerica will participate in the M-LEC and will earn fees.
The banks' broker-dealer operations could be paid for helping the new structure raise capital.
The conduit will raise most of its money by selling commercial paper. Each member bank will put in an unspecified amount of its own capital into the fund. Other US and non-US-based banks will likely join the consortium within weeks.
Citigroup led the push for the super conduit rescue plan. Large amounts of its SIV debt come due in November. Increasingly debt analysts were forecasting difficult times for SIVs. A Citigroup research report that was issued two days before Treasury and the banks met for the first time, stated, "SIVs now find themselves in the eye of the storm".

Banks would face large losses if their affiliated funds were forced to sell billions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities and other assets since that selling pressure would force prices down. That would lead to large write offs at those new, lower market prices.

During recent months, Citigroup affiliates have sold some $20 billion in assets.
Some bankers object to the plan. They labeled it an escape loophole for Citigroup, which has more SIVs than any other bank. Citigroup accounted for approximately 25% of the global SIV market. As of August, 2007, total assets held by SIVs according to various sources approximately amount $400 billion.

The M-LEC fund is will buy securities rated AAA or AA at Standard & Poor's and Aaa or Aa at Moody's Investors Service at market prices. According to preliminary reports, it will not buy subprime mortgage assets.
Christian Stracke, a London-based strategist at CreditSights Inc., a New York bond research firm said, "This is mostly symbolic... The banks were going to need to inject more liquidity into the SIVs anyway, so the public co-operation just makes the bail-outs of SIVs seem more orderly."
According to a September 11, 2007 report by UBS AG, SIVs' holdings include about 41% financial-sector debt, 22% prime residential mortgage securities, 12% collateralized debt obligations, 8% each for commercial mortgage-backed securities and non-mortgage asset- backed bonds, and subprime accounts at 2%.
Alex Roever is a debt strategist at JPMorgan Chase who has not been involved in discussions. He estimates that SIVs have at least $320 billion in assets.
The M-LEC will be used to purchase risky mortgage securities and other assets in order to decrease pressure on credit markets that have the potential to threaten the broader economy.
The plan is reminiscent of 1998's bailout of Long Term Capital Management, the hedge fund run by a group of consummate hedge fund experts. At that time a group of the largest banks joined under the Fed's orchestration to prevent LTCM from collapsing. Today's collaboration demonstrates the serious concerns amongst financial institutions and government.
Alex Roever of JPMorgan Chase said that, "Treasury is very serious about getting some solution in place to take away the fear hanging over the markets... It is a very challenging thing to do. There are so many parties involved and they all don’t agree."
Markets have been impacted by the problem of subprime mortgage debt. Market participants are also concerned about other potentially dangerous investments. Some of these include collateralized-debt obligations, CDOs, which are packaged agglomerations of questionably-based bonds, lower-grade mortgage-backed securities which are packages of home loans with high potential to default, and market-neutral hedge funds that should perform well during downturns, but have not recently. Also, there remain the massive junk bond financings for private equity buyouts and the questionable stock offerings buyout firms promote in order to take their prior targets public.